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PARTY AUTONOMY IN CONTRACTS
SPECIFYING FOREIGN LAW
ROBERT JOHNSTON*
The energetic and steady flow of United States investment into
foreign countries since the start of the Second World War is a com-
monplace of modem economic history; however, the opportunities
provided for private investment on a large or small scale by the Com-
mon Market, the European Free Trade Area, the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, and the Alliance for Progress have focused new
attention on the many problems involved.'
Because international investment activity, whether as modest as a
single transaction for the carriage of goods to Europe and their con-
signment there for sale, or as large as the purchase of an entire European
manufacturing complex, involves contracts that necessarily bring into
play conflicts of law principles, the determination of the law that gov-
erns all such contracts is one of the important problems this area of
economic activity generates.
A classical principle of the conflicts of law is that the law of the
place where a contract is made governs.2 Elaboration of this rule re-
quires that the law of the place of making governs those aspects of
the contract which concern the making, and the law of the place of
performance governs those aspects which concern the performance.
Another doctrine permits the parties to a contract to decide at the time
of the making what law they wish to have govern the contract. An
early English expression of this doctrine appears in Robinson v. Bland,3
where the problem was whether or not a gambling debt won in France,
where gambling debts were not void, was recoverable in England, where
they were void. Lord Mansfield, speaking about the conflicts of law
question said: "The general rule established ex comitate et jure gentium
is, that the place where the contract is made, and not where the action
is brought, is to be considered in expounding and enforcing the con-
tract. But this rule admits of an exception where the parties (at the
time of making the contract) had a view to a different kingdom." 4
* Harvard College BA. (1960); Marshall Wythe School of Law B.C.L. (1965).
1. Surrey, American Investments Abroad, 7 PRAc. LAw. 13 (1961), 8 PRAc. LAw. 45
(1962).
2. Stunpf v. Hallahan, 91 N.Y.S. 1062 (1905).
3. 1 W. B1. 234, 96 E.R. 129 (1760).
4. Id. at 259, 96 E.R. at 141.
[.37]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
An early American counterpart is the language from the Supreme Court
case of Wayman v. Southard,5 holding: "In every forum a contract
is governed by the law with a view to which it was made." 0 This doc-
trine is called party autonomy and is the subject of inquiry here.
THE APPLICATION OF PARTY AUTONOMY
While the doctrine seems settled and decisive in theory, it is not at
all so clear in application. An important commentator in the field found
in 1935 that American courts were continuing to accept the doctrine,7
but another, writing recently in Practical Lawyer, notes: ". . . there is
still strong and purportedly growing opposition to allowing parties the
choice of law governing their contracts." 8 Morris J. Levin, writing
in the Georgetown Law Journal,9 proposes this party autonomy doc-
trine for contracts:
Where the parties to a commercial contract have made an express stipu-
lation that the law of a particular state or nation should govern the
contract, and the law so stipulated has a substantial connection
with the transaction and its enforcement would not be contrary to the
public policy of the forum, then the forum should use the internal
(domestic) law of the particular state or nation stipulated as governing
all questions arising under the contract.10
The thrust of this proposal ensures use of the internal law of the
referred jurisdiction" and arises from the author's criticism of the Vita
Food'3 case and the Duskin 4 case for their reference to the whole law
of the stipulated jurisdictions in a manner that might permit anomalous
results through the doctrine of renvoi. The difficulty, however, is that,
while permitting an exception to the doctrine where there are infringe-
ments of the forum's public policy, it invites perpetuation of the
courts' present sporadic application of the doctrine at all. 5 Nonetheless,
5. 10 Wheat. (23 U.S.) 1 (1825).
6. Id. at 48.
7. 2 BFA CoNFicrs oF LAws 1172-73 (1935).
8. Schliesser, International Sales Agreements, 10 PRAc. LAW. 45 (1964).
9. Levin, Party Autonomy: Choice of Law Clauses in Commercial Contracts, 46 GEo.
L. JouR. 260, 261 (1957-58).
10. Ibid.
11. Id. at 262.
13. Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Co., [19391 A.C. 277.
14. Duskin v. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corp., 167 F. 2d 727 (6th Cir. 1948).
15. Conflicts of Laws: Party Autonomy in Contracts, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 553, 566
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Levin feeis in cases where the parties have stipulated the governing law,
the lower federal courts, at least, have applied the doctrine in areas
in which Supreme Court opinion was as yet unexpressed.-" On the
other hand, another commentator writing at the same time found, with
respect to contracts of passage, "While it is usually clear that parties
may stipulate the use of the law of a foreign country, it is sometimes
not clear to what extent such a provision should govern subsequent deal-
ings between the parties relating to the contract,' 17
It appears, then, that in American jurisprudence in general, the
doctrine of party autonomy faces a variety of attitudes. In this partic-
ular discussion, however, interest focuses on the attitudes of United
States courts which are peculiar to contracts stipulating the laws of
foreign nations or foreign contracts stipulating United States law.
The recent cases arising from such contracts appear to obfuscate the
bravely and simply stated echoes of the doctrine. One example is
Duval v. Skouras,18 where after reciting the principles of lex loci con-
tractus and lex loci solutionis, the court went on: "These general rules,
however, yield to "the primary canon of construction, which requires
that, where it can be ascertained, the intention of the parties shall
govern." 19 Another earlier example appears in Smith v. Compania
Litografica de la Habana,20 where the court noted the New York
conflict of laws rule:
The general rule is that the lex loci contractus prima facie determines
the validity, obligation and legal affect of a contract. This rule yields
to an express or implied contrary intention of the parties that some
other law is to control. When a contract is to be performed in a
place other than the one in which it was entered into, it is presumed
that the parties intended that the lex loci solutionis is to control. When
the place of performance is in different states or countries, the pre-
sumption as to the intention of the parties to have the lex loci solu-
tionis control does not obtain, and the general rule applies, in the ab-
sence of an express agreement to the contrary.2'
(1957): "Invocation of the public policy of the forum is a frequent deterrent to party
autonomy in all these areas:'
16. Supra note 7, at 276.
17. Determining the Scope of Choice of Law Provisions in Steamship Tickets: Ad-
hesion Contracts and the Conflict of Laws, 65 YALE L. Jour. 553 (1956).
18. 181 Misc. 651, 44 N.YS. 2d 107 (1st Dept. 1943).
19. Id. at 111.
20. 127 Misc. 508, 217 N.Y.S. 39 (1926).
21. Id. at 42.
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The courts, both state and federal in New York, have been squeam-
ish about agreeing to party autonomy in contracts calling for the use
of foreign nations' laws.
THE ATTITUDES OF THE COURTS
In their language and reasoning, the decisions betray judicial senti-
ments ranging from in difference to hostility to nationalism and suggest
the conclusion that persons making contracts, exposing themselves to
already unpredictable applications of conflicts of laws notions, will be
more fairly served than they are now by the restriction of party
autonomy to evidence aiding application of what is called the center
of gravity theory.2
The cases revealing these attitudes fall into these categories:
1) Cases permitting the stipulated law to govern,
2) Cases in which the court makes assumptions about the parties' intent
toward the governing law,
3) Cases demanding a substantial connection to the stipulated law or
demanding no conflict with public policy,
4) Cases in which the court refuses to be bound by the stipulated law,
5) Cases in which courts avoid having to use the stipulated law.
PERMITTING THE STIPULATED LAW TO GOVERN
Illustrative of cases permitting a stipulated foreign law to govern a
contract is a nineteenth-century federal case in which a shipment of
cattle was lost en route to England under a contract of carriage made
in Baltimore.23 It is remarkable about the case that the critical differ-
ence in the applicable law was that by English law a carrier could con-
tract away his common law duties of care, whereas in the United
States the interests of public policy prohibited a carrier from so at-
tempting to do.
Nevertheless, because the contract of shipment specified that all
,questions arising under the contract were to be determined by English
law, the District Court permitted the contractual limitation of liability
to exculpate the defendant without considering any public policy
involved.24
22. Morris, Reply to Proper Law of the Contract, 3 INT. LAW Q. 197 (1957).
23. The Oranmore, 24 F. 922 (D. Md. 1895).
24. Cf. the domestic case of Ringling Bros.-Barnum and Bailey Combined Shows v.
Olvera, et al, 119 F. 2d 584 (9th Cir. 1941), where the court permitted the stipulated
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More recently, the Supreme Court case of Lauritzen v. Larsen25
acknowledged the existence of public policy as a responsibility of the
forum while permitting a stipulated foreign law to govern the plain-
tiff's rights under a labor contract. Although the thrust of this case
was the scope of the Jones Act and the decision to use general maritime
law in determining the choice of law, the court mentioned with respect
to the choice of law specified by the contract:
We face the fact that this contract was explicit that the Danish law
and the contract with the Danish Union were to apply. Except as for-
bidden by some public policy, the tendency of the law is to apply in
contract matters the law which the parties intended to apply. We are
aware of no public policy that would prevent the parties to this con-
tract, which contemplates performance in a multitude of territorial
jurisdictions and on the high seas, from so settling upon the law of the
flag state as their governing code. This arrangement is so natural and
compatible with the policy of the law that even in the absence of an
express provision it would probably have been implied.... We think
a quite different result would follow if the contract attempted to avoid
applicable law, for example, so as to apply foreign law to an American
ship.26
If there is a public policy for reserving United States law to apply
to strong United States interests, it may explain the breadth of the hold-
ing in Overseas Trading Co., SA v. U. S.27 This was an action in
quasi-contract brought for recovery of an overpayment caused by
mistake of fact in a contract made in Belgium for the sale of surplus.
U. S. Government property. The contract specified, "This contract
shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the law novr
prevailing in the District of Columbia, United States of America."
state law to restrict liability in the case to wilful or gross negligence. "It was competent
for the parties, even if the law of the forum was different, to agree upon and fix the
law controlling all the liabilities and obligations of the parties with regard to performance
as that of the state of the contract's execution, and not have it constantly shifting as
the circus wandered from one jurisdiction to another. '
25. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
26. Id., pp. 588-589. Cf. also language in the domestic labor contract case of McKane
v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 196 La. 326, 199 So. 175 (1940) holding, at 182:
"We think, however, that, with relation to the applicability of the worknen's com-
pensation law, the better rule is, that the intention of the parties to the contract should
be the determining factor.....
27. 159 F. Supp. 382 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
28. Id. at 384.
1966]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Plaintiff was an assignee of the purchaser, who had since assigned all
his rights under the contract to a third party, OMA Trading Corp.
Plaintiff argued that because of the place of contracting, Belgian law
applied. This law permitted quasi-contractual recovery in such cir-
cumstances. Further, the autonomy clause in the contract did not specif-
ically' cover the effect of an assignment. The Court of Claims dis-
agreed:
But we are unwilling to acknowledge further that District of Colum-
bia law is applicable only when construing the contract. . . .The
phrase 'governed by' is extremely broad in scope and not unreasonably
includes the nature of the action for recovery, whether the action be
on the contract or in the form of quasi-contract. 29
The court reasoned that multitudes of possible legal problems often
encouraged autonomy clauses couched in general terms. But that the
parties used general language in taking a view to the law of a particular
jurisdiction just as easily supports a different result. There are cases
in another area of this discussion that not only refuse to follow an
autonomy clause for being too generally stated but also distinguish
most carefully between an autonomy clause for the purpose of inter-
pretation and an autonomy clause for the purpose of validation. 30
Born v. Norwegian America Line Inc. 31 appears to be the most re-
cent example of the smooth application of stipulated foreign law in a
contract without discussion of the rightness of its use. The plaintiff
sued to recover for injuries sustained aboard defendant's vessel while
on a voyage from New York to Denmark. Plaintiff purchased the
ticket in New Jersey and on receipt signed the contract of carriage
that it represented. The contract provided: "all questions arising on
this contract ticket shall be decided according to Norwegian law, with
reference to which'this contract is made." 32
At issue here was whether or not defendant's motion for summary
judgment should be sustained, made on the ground that the plaintiff had
not brought the action within the one year period of limitations as pro-
vided in the contract. It appeared that the parties agreed Norwegian
law applied to the validity of this one-year period of limitations.
29. Ibid.
30. E. Gerli & Co, Inc. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 48 F. 2d 115 (2d Cir. 1931);
Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Line, 221 F. 2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955), infra.
31. 173 F. Supp. 33 (SD.N.Y. 1959).
82. Id. at 34.
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Plaintiff in reply to the motion for judgment said defendant had
waived the limitation and had failed to direct his attention to it. There-
fore, the Norwegian law on this point was the matter of fact in issue
that entitled plaintiff to a trial. But on the basis of depositions at the
pre-trial hearing and applying Norweigian law,33 the court decided
that defendant had not waived the limitation and that plaintiff had
constructive notice of it by its mere appearance on the ticket. Yet a
different result might have obtained if the plaintiff had argued that
Norwegian law did not apply at all.
While the cases in this group illustrate courts' conceding to parties
to a contract the power to stipulate the law of foreign nations as
governing, it is interesting to speculate that the concessions may have
been affected either by national policy or by incidental and unremarked
connections between the contract and the stipulated law. The Oran-
more, 4 in abandoning the public policy of the forum, and Overseas
Trading,35 in that jurisdiction of the stipulated law was unconnected
with both the place of making and the place of performance, appear to.
come closest to fulfilling the theory of full party autonomy stated in
Robinson v. Bland 6
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES
Several cases demonstrate courts seeking to achieve a desired result
by indulging in presumptions as to the parties' intentions concerning
the governing law.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hyde,3 7 defendant Hyde
and his wife made a separation agreement in France, specifying Paris
as the forum and specifying desertion as the ground that the wife would
sue for divorce, and further providing for a trust in lieu of alimony
and dower. The agreement provided that the law of New York should
govern the interpretation of the contract.
To escape the doctrine that income from a trust to discharge a hus-
band's marital obligations is taxable to the husband,38 defendant as-
serted that the contract to make a divorce was illegal; the wife had
33. The court cited Ferran v. Skips A/S Pacific, [19571 Nordiske Domme i
Sjofartsanliggender 248.
34. Supra note 23.
35. Supra note 27.
36. Supra note 3.
37. 82 F. 2d 174 (2d Cir. 1936).
38. Douglas v. Willcuts, 196 U.S. 1 (1935).
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released him of his marital obligations in the divorce she had later
obtained, and as a result the trust was a voluntary gift.
In order to establish this the defendant referred to the Domestic
Relations Law of New York. The court ruled it could not accept the
taxpayer's assumption that the validity of the contract must be deter-
mined by the law of New York: "The recitation that it was to be 'con-
strued and interpreted' by the law of New York cannot be taken as
an expression of intention that its validity was to be governed by that
law; nor would such intention, if expressed, be controlling." " The
record failed to show that defendant had proved his contention accord-
ing to French law.
Kleve et al. v. Basler Lebensversicherungsgesellschaft in Basel4" shows,
by a ruling on a venue clause, a more positive assumption about the
parties' view to a foreign jurisdiction. The case involved an action
quasi-in-rem begun by attachment of property of the defendant Swiss
insurance company located in New York, for unlawful detainer of the
cash surrender value of plaintiff's policies after demand for payment
had been duly made.
The principal defense was the act-of-state doctrine. Since the con-
tract was made in Germany with German citizens, German law applied.
A German law of 1935 required the cash surrender value of life insur-
ance policies held by insured Jews be surrendered to the government
in full discharge of the insurance companies' obligations.
The plaintiffs argued that since the insurance contract permitted
them to have payment sent to them at their expense, they had an option
as to the place of performance. Therefore, Swiss law governed, since
Switzerland was the place where the plaintiffs by radiogram actually
demanded payment. The court ruled, however, it could not be the
intent of the contract that the place of performance be the place where
the plaintiff wanted the money directed. At least, the law of Switzer-
land was inapplicable.
Beginning with the doctrine that the intention and agreement of the
parties as to the governing law be controlling, the court said:
The policies were written in Germany on the lives of German
nationals and were payable in Germany.... Finally, the policies pro-
vide that the proper venue for litigation resulting from the insurance
contract will be the German courts.... Our courts will not recognize
39. Supra note 37, at 176.
40. 45 N.Y. 2d 882 (1943).
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a venue clause which ousts our courts of jurisdiction. But that does
not mean that such a venue clause should not be heeded as an indication
of the parties' intention as to governing law.... There is no question
but that the parties intended German law to govern and that, perforce,
German law did govern.4 1
The court further said the offensive character of the German statute
in question did not make it any the less controlling, the case not being
one of enforcing the German law in the United States but of recogniz-
ing the force of German law in Germany.
42
In In Re Rosenbergers' Estates,43 a mother and son in Holland in
1940, fearing capture and deportation by the Nazi government, cabled
money to New York to respondent bank with instructions to open a
joint account. The bank placed in the process of communication an
acceptance of these deposits. The mother predeceased her son. The
administrator of the mother's estate argued that the concept of a joint
tenancy being unknown to the Dutch law, such a transaction being
wholly void as an attempted testamentary disposition under that law,
the transaction was ineffective to change ownership of the funds from
a tenancy in common, even if the parties had intended a joint tenancy.
The court answered:
The law which determines the validity of a contract . . . is the law
which the parties intended to apply, provided the transaction has some
reasonable connection with the place where such law operates. The
parties voluntarily transferred the money to a bank in New York and
chose a form of account recognized by the law of this State. All par-
ties intended the law of New York to govern the transaction. 44
Decided in the same year, Auten v. Auten45 demonstrates the court
making assumptions about the parties' view to the governing law in aid
41. Id. at 885, 886.
42. See Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 266
N.Y. 71, 193 N.E. 897 (1934): "It cannot be against the public policy of this state to
hold nationals to the contracts which they have made in their own country to be
performed there according to the laws of that country," and De Beeche, et al. v. The
South American Stores, [1935] A.C. 148: ". . . It cannot be controverted that the law
of this country will not compel the fulfillment of an obligation whose performance
involves the doing in a foreign country of something which the supervenient law of
that country has rendered it illegal to do."
43. 131 N.Y.S. 2d 59 (1st Dept. 1954).
44. Id., p. 66.
45. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E. 2d 99 (1954).
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of applying the center of gravity theory.46 Here a wife sued her
husband in New York for arrears in payments under a separation agree-
ment made in New York in 1933. Both parties were English, and the
agreement contemplated the wife's return to England. The wife had
filed a petition for separation in an English court in 1934; and while
the action never went to trial in England, the result was an interlocutory
order for the payment of alimony. The question at bar, then, was
whether or not the English action constituted a repudiation by the wife
of the 1933 separation agreement. The answer would be no if English
law governed the agreement. Adding to the number of connections
the contract had with the law of England, the court assumed this about
the parties' view:
Nor could the parties have expected or believed that any law other
than England's would govern the effect of the wife's institution of a
separate action. It is most unlikely that the wife could have intended
to subject her rights under English law to the law of a jurisdiction
several thousands miles distant, with which she had not the slightest
familiarity.47
The contract of passage case of Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., InC.48
contains language appearing to acknowledge the value of a foreign na-
don's judicial policy in assuming a party's view toward that nation's law
as governing his contract. The plaintiff was German and purchased in
Germany a return ticket of passage to the United States. The con-
tract, however, was written in English, which plaintiff did not know,
and stipulated United States law was to govern all questions arising
under it. Among its provisions was a one-year limitation on- bringing
personal injury actions against the company.
Plaintiff failed to bring her action within the contractually limited
period, so United States law, if applied, would bar her action. But the
court found the circumstances demanded the application of German
law. The court noted the practice of the Federal courts was to em-
ploy the center of gravity theory assuming parties contracted with a
view to the law having the most significant contacts with the contract,
and while an express stipulation of a law would not confine judicial
46. This is the doctrine that locates the proper law of the contract by finding which
jurisdiction is favored by the weight of incidental connections with the contract. The
court here cited Barber Co. v. Hughes, 63 N.E. 2d 417 (Ind. 1945).
47. Supra note 33, p. 103.
48. 151 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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inquiry to the stipulation, it would be a weighty element in finding the
proper law. The court distinguished the related Siegelman case49 on
the ground the contractual incidents were in the United States. Then,
regarding the plaintiff's view to the governing law, the court said:
In the instant case, however, all of the incidents surrounding the
sale of the ticket took place in Germany. Plaintiff, if she considered
any law, probably felt that German law controlled. It may be that
German law affords protection to parties in this plaintiff's position by
not attaching great significance to 'objective expectations' as ex-
pressed in steamship tickets, and perhaps such protection might even
amount to a strong national policy. It would seem that federal' con-
flicts law should take cognizance of such an attitude by the foreign
sovereign where it is coincident with so many of the significant con-
tacts. While parties should not be precluded from seeking predict-
ability and uniformity by stipulating their choice of law, unilaterally
imposed provisions of this nature should not be enforced unless the
party urging enforcement provided the other illiterate in the language
of the contract, with knowledge of what was intended. If, for ex-
ample, plaintiff had been given a German counterpart of the contract
and had understood its terms, the stipulation of United States law
would probably be binding upon her. As in the Siegelman case, she
could be charged, as a matter of federal conflicts law, with autonomy
to choose to be bound by a particular legal system. But unless a party,
in circumstances such as those found in the instant case, can be said
to have understood that another law from the one normally govern-
ing the contract is to control, it would be improper to decide a ques-
tion which poses a choice between legal systems having quite different
jurisprudential philosophies on American contract law principlesP °
Since the contract was being performed under the flag of the stipulated
jurisdiction, it is hard to decide if the couit's assumptions about the
plaintiff's expectations were critical in tipping the balance of contractual
connections in favor of German law. At least, the'court's consideration
of the plaintiff's possible state of mind and German public policy,
appear to play a substantial part in its refusal to follow the stipulation
of law clause.
In other recent cases in this category, courts have made assumptions
about the contract law of Mexico in dealing with a party's defenses
49. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Line, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955).
50. Supra note 48 at 468.
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to a suit under a contract made there.5 They have assumed from
circumstances surrounding negotiation for a contract of employment
with a Pittsburgh hotel that the parties intended the application of
Venezuelan labor law.52 In 1960, the court decided in the case of a
contract made in Kuwait between a Lebanese and a Delaware corpora-
tion, where neither party offered proof of Kuwait law, that the parties'
own attitude that the law of the forum applied amounted to a stipula-
tion that New York law applied. This was true although New York
was unconnected with the place of making, or performance, or the
domicile of the parties.53 In a 1964 case,' the Supreme Court of
Louisiana in an action by a Cuban refugee to recover the cash sur-
render value of a fully paid up policy, purchased in Cuba through an
agent of the company, but accepted in Louisiana, respecting which all
premium payments had been made in U.S. dollars in Louisiana, decided
plaintiff's receiving and paying loans on the policy in Cuba in pesos
showed no intention to modify the contract and failed to permit any
assumption that Cuban law, with its confiscatory legislation, applied
so as to defeat recovery.
What these cases contribute is the disposition of some courts, given
appealing fact situations, to consider an express stipulation of the law
to govern a contract as no more important than the assumptions they
themselves might make of the parties' states of mind, that is, the disposi-
tion of some courts not to take party autonomy seriously.
A SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION TO THE STIPULATED LAW
The consistent qualification of party autonomy, however, is the
judicial demand that the circumstances of the contract have a sub-
stantial connection with the stipulated law. LevinM notes that courts
like to find connections between the contract and the law stipulated,
and are very reluctant to use the stipulated law when to do so would be
51. Refrigeradora del Noroeste, SA v. Applebaum, d/b/a Penguin Frozen Foods, 138
F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ill. 1956).
52. Klekamp v. Blaw-Knox Co, 179 F. Supp. 328 (S.D. Cal. 1959). There were sub-
stantial connections between the United States and the contract, but this court ignored
the opportunity that others might have taken to consider the difference if any between
the public policy behind employment contracts made in California and Venezuela.
53. El Hoss Engineering and Transport Company, Ltd., and American Independent
Oil Company, 183 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
54. Theye y Ajuria v. Pan American Life Insurance Co., 245 La. 755, 161 So. 2d
70 (1964).
55. Supra note 9.
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against the public policy of the forum. "Therefore, it can be said that
the courts, by never following the parties' intention where there was
not such a real relation, have incorporated this limitation into any rule
of the intention theory." 51 The generally acceptable connections are:
the place of making,
the place of performance,
the place of domicile of the parties,
the place with integral connections with the contract,
sets of rules well known to professional or business groups,
the situs of the security.
Another writer notes:
To the extent that such choice [of law by the parties] is recognized
at all, it is almost uniformly qualified by a requirement of substantial
contractual connection with the stipulated law.... Invocation of the
public policy of the forum is a frequent deterrent to party autonomy
in all these areas.5
A turn-of-century Supreme Court case sets the tone of the judicial
attitude. In London Assurance v. Companhia de Moagens do Barreiros
the shipping insurance contract stipulated claims under the policy were
to be adjusted according to the usages of Lloyd's. Permitting the stipu-
lation to guide adjudication of the case the court noted:
... We think the interpretation of the contract was intended by the
parties to depend upon the principles of English law as they obtained
and were recognized in England by the usages prevailing at Lloyd's.
This is what the parties expressly stipulated for, and it is no injustice
to the company to decide its rights according to the principles of the
law of the country which it has agreed to be bound by, so long as,
in a case like this, the foreign law is not in any way contrary to the
policy of our own.59
56. Id. at 266.
57. Note, Conflict of Laws: "Party Autonomy" in Contracts, 57 ,COLUM. L. Rxv.
553, 566 (1957).
58. 167 U.S. 149 (1897).
59. Id. at 169.
See Barndt v. Det Bergenske Dampsklbsselslkab, 28 F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), in
which a contrary public policy defeats the stipulated law employed to limit the ship-
per's liability; also Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Corcoran, 9 F. 2d 724 (2d Cir. 1925).
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The substantial connection requirement is implicit in the court's
approach to discovering the proper law of an antenuptial agreement
which was the subject of Strebler v. Wolf et al60 The plaintiff, a
French national, sought in New York the property located in New
York of his deceased wife who had moved there after living with the
plaintiff for two years. The ground of the claim was an antenuptial
agreement between the plaintiff and decedent made in France and
specifically referring to French law, by which the agreement was to be
governed. This agreement provided for a universal community of
property such that at the death of one party the assets and liabilities
of both were to belong to the survivor alone. The defendants in the
case however -claimed they were to take according to the terms of
decedent's will, because under the law of New York, which they
claimed governed, such contracts were apparently not valid.
The court carefully examined the applicable laws of France0 ' and
decided such an agreement as this was valid and effective in France
to create a right in the nature of a joint tenancy in the entire commu-
nity property of the marriage. But it would not be enough for defend-
ants to prevail to show a view to the law of New York. After reciting
the doctrine of lex loci contractus the court said:
... however it is the intention of the parties that governs and. by ex-
press or implied agreement they may select another jurisdiction. Two
things are then requisite-the property is situated here and the parties
intended that it should be administered here in accordance with the
laws of this state.62
Since it appeared from the evidence there was a French contract and
a view to French law, and all the property contested in the suit was
a part of the community of property created by the contract, there
were no connections with New York law sufficient to cause its appli-
cation, although the wife's estate was physically located in New York.
63
The vulnerability to public policy of contracting parties' view to the
60. 152 Misc. 859, 272 N.Y.S. 653 (lst Dept. 1934).
61. Id., p. 658. See sections 1526, 1497, and 1837, French Civil Code, permitting a
community of present and future property in a marriage, and sections 1399, 217, 1421,
and 1426, cited by the court.
62. Id., p. 657, citing Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N.Y. 381, 395, 187 N.E. 65, 71.
63. Id., p. 658. Cf. also cautionary dicta in Travellers' Insurance Co. v. American
Fidelity and Casualty Co., 164 F. Supp. 393 (D. Minn. 1958). "However, the power of the
parties to choose the governing law is not without limits. That chosen must be the
law of a place which has a substantial connection with the contract, and in exercising
that choice, the parties must act in good faith and without intent to evade the law;"
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law of a particular jurisdiction, however found, appears again in
Compania de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industri Hypotekshanken
i Finland A/B. 4 Here, plaintiff Argentinian corporation had purchased
bonds of defendant Finnish bank. The contract of sale had been made
in New York, with payment promised in gold coin of the United
States of the standard of weight and fineness as it existed on July 1,
1924. The bonds were payable at the office of the New York under-
writer Lee, Higginson & Co. Prior to the suit a joint resolution of
CongressP5 provided "gold clauses" were against public policy and
payments in contracts must be made in whatever currency was at the
time legal tender for public and private debts. Plaintiff corporation
sued to recover the difference between the value of the gold coins
and the value of the proffered notes.
It is well settled parties contract subject to the will of the sovereign.
If the parties here had contracted with a view to United States law,
then failure to pay in gold coins would not be a breach of the con-
tract.
This was what the court found, as it said:
The contract was made in New York, and the bonds are payable and
the entire performance of the contract is to take place in the United
States. If no other intention is revealed, it must be taken that it was
intended by the parties that United States law should be applicable
to this contract. The intention of the parties, express or implied, gen-
erally determines the law that governs a contract.... The parties to
a contract may not by their intention, however expressed, override
the laws of the country in which suit is brought when a matter of
the public policy of that country is involved. Even comity with the
laws of another jurisdiction never extends to the enforcement of a
law of that jurisdiction which violates a positive law of the country
wherein suit is brought and is contrary to its public policy 6r
William Whitman Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co, 125 F. Supp. 137, 147 (D. Del.
1954), ". .. The jurisdiction whose law is adopted by the express intent of the parties
must be one which has a real connection with one or more of the various elements
of the contract and parties may not arbitrarily select the law of some jurisdiction which
has no relation to the matter in controversy;" and Owens, et al. v. Hagenback-Wallace
Shows Co., 58 R.I. 162, 192 A. 158 (1937), denying effect to a stipulation of Florida
law where the court found nothing in the record properly connecting the contract
to Florida law. This last case is directly contra on its facts to Ringling Bros.-Barnum
and Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Olvera, et al, supra, note 17.
64. 269 N.Y. 22, 198 NE. 617 (1935).
65. 31 U.S.CA. 463.
66. Supra note 51, pp. 618, 621; Palmer v. Chamberlain, 191 F. 2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951);
Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Boseman, 84 F. 2d 701, 705 (5th Cir. 1936).
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A 1955 case in the field of shipping, Siegelman v. Cunard White Star
Line Ltd.,0 7 contributes a comprehensive and conscientiously reasoned
handling of the limits contractual connections and public policy draw
in their uncertain contours around the freedom of parties to stipulate
that a foreign law is to govern their contract.
The case involved a contract of passage made in New York reciting
all questions arising thereunder should be decided according to Eng-
lish law. An initial question was whether in determining the law to
apply to the effect of the contract the court should be guided by New
York or federal conflicts of laws rules. Because this was a maritime
case, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins68 does not require the application of other
than federal maritime law.
The language in which the court couched its handling of the speci-
fication of English law so as to permit being guided thereby, merits
quoting in extenso.
• . . The provision that English law should govern must be taken
to represent the intention of both parties. Therefore, this provision,
if effective under the federal choice of law rule, renders English law
applicable here, even though, absent the provision, some other
law would govern under the applicable federal conflicts rule.
Liverpool also indicates that there may be an exception to this
rule where a contract stipulates another law, but the scope of this
exception is not clear. Thus, since we cannot assume that the parties'
choice of law will always foreclose the court from applying another
law, our question is whether the contract provision here should have
the effect, under federal conflicts rules, of making the English law
applicable to the particular question posed by this case....
As we have said, we construe the contract as establishing the
intention of the parties that English law should govern both the inter-
pretation and validity of its terms. And we think it clear that the
federal conflicts rule will give effect to the parties' intention that Eng-
lish law is to be applied to the interpretation69 of the contract. Stipu-
lating the governing law for this purpose is much like stipulating that
words of the contract have the meanings given in a particular dic-
tionary. . . . On the other hand, there is much doubt that parties
can stipulate the law which should govern the validity of their con-
67. Supra note 49.
68. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
69. The court here referred to the general statement of the rule lex loci contractus
as set forth in Liverpool and Great Western Steam Navigation Co. v. Phoenix Insurance
Co, 129 U.S. 397 (1889).
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tract. To permit parties to stipulate the law which should govern
the validity of their agreement would afford them an artificial device
for avoiding the policies of the state which would otherwise regulate
the permissibility of their agreement.
Where the law of the parties' intention has been permitted to
govern the validity of contracts, it has often been said 1) that the
choice of law must be bona fide, and 2) that the law chosen must be
that of a jurisdiction having some relation to the agreement, generally
either place of making or the place of performance.
• . . But we express no opinion on what result would follow if
we had stronger policies at stake, or if the parties had attempted a
feigned rather than a genuine solution of the conflicts problem.70
Language in these cases upholding the primacy of forum public
policy and of contractual connections with the stipulated law frequently
appear, as though in response to a precautionary reflex. They appear as
part of a general statement of the law, and reveal in courts' attitudes
toward party autonomy a general malaise.
COURTS REFUSING TO BE BOUND BY STIPULATED LAW
Closely related to the cases demanding a substantial contractual con-
nection with the stipulated law are the cases in which the courts refuse
to recognize any binding force in the stipulation of foreign law, but
consider the stipulation as evidence helping them to locate the center
of gravity of the contract.
Judge Hand made E. Gerli & Co., Inc. v. Cunard Steamship Co.71
represent a very strong example of this hostility, seldom since followed
with comparable vigor. Ruling that a specific reference to a substantive
point of English law in the clause in issue overrode a general stipulation
of Italian law as governing the whole contract, he' said:
People cannot by agreement substitute the law of another place; they
may of course incorporate any provision they wish into their agree-
ments-a statute like anything else-and when they do, courts will try
to make sense out of the whole, so far as they can. But an agreement
is not a contract, except as the law says it shall be .... Some law must
impose the obligation, and the parties have nothing whatever to do
with that .... 72
70. Supra note 49, at 196. See also Greenwald v. Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd, 160
F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
71. 48 F. 2d 115 (2d Cir. 1931).
72. Id. at 117. See also A. S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Company, 3 N.Y.2d 369, 144
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Chinchilla v. Foreign Tankship Corporation73 contains language
equally indifferent to the idea of party autonomy. The suit was brought
by a ship radio operator for breach of a contract of employment fol-
lowing refusal to rehire him upon his return from a medical leave
of absence. The contract had been signed in a Spanish port, the ship
was of Panamanian registry, and the contract conditions of employ-
ment clause stated Panama law was to apply to all cases of illness
and injury incurred while in the service of the vessel. The parties
to the suit seemed to agree that Panama law should govern.74
The court, however, applied New York law to the contract:
And while the parties to a transaction do not have complete auton-
omy in the choice of law that governs that transaction, circumstances
may indicate that for some purposes they refer to the law of a
sovereign other than the one which would normally govern as con-
trolling in a limited way their respective rights and duties, and those
indications will be respected. . . . There is nothing to suggest that
any act of the parties had its 'locus' in Panama, except the flag of
the vessel .... The 'Conditions of Employment' . . . provide 'that
Panama law shall apply in all cases of illness or injury incurred while
in the service of the vessel.' In view of these facts it is fair to assume
that except as otherwise provided in the articles and the accompanying
document, the application of Panama law was to be limited to a claim
based upon injury or illness. That is not the claim here .... 75
Moving from this to finding the center of gravity of the contract
lay elsewhere than the place of the stipulated law, although the parties
in court continued to agree about its applicability, would be a familiar
step to take; but the court went further:
Why then should our own 'internal' law not apply? Basically it is
our law that governs from the mere fact that the litigation is before
us; it is a truism that a case before the courts of New York is to be
decided by New York law. History and policy may suggest an in-
quiry for certain purposes into the law of another jurisdiction in order
N.E.2d 371 (1957), in which the court ignored a stipulation of Oregon law and decided
the case on the basis of the law of the forum, without accounting for any assumption
of view to New York law or any public policy.
73. 195 Misc. 895, 91 N.Y.S. 2d 213 (1949).
74. Id. at 214.
75. Id. at 217, citing Dreyfus v. Patterson Steamships Ltd., 43 F. 2d 824 (2d Cir. 1930),
and E. Gerli & Co, Inc. v. Cunard Steamship Co, supra note 59.
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to determine that litigation, but unless they do, we decide a case by
reference to our own corpus juris unenriched by incorporation of
foreign law. Our policy ... is to look to the 'law of the flag.' But
the parties here have indicated that they wish to have the consequences
of certain of their -acts removed from the power of Panama to de-
termine, that wish will be respected, and the alternative law is that
of the forum wherein they find themselves."6
A more recent series of shipping cases demonstrates a milder and
perhaps more generous application of the doctrine relevant to this part
of the discussion, holding the stipulation of governing law in a contract
as only one piece of evidence a court may consider in determining
the proper law to be applied.
The complexity of Mulvihill v. Furness, Withy & Co., Ltd.77 arises
from the nature of the action, an appeal from a motion for summary
judgment, and from the fact the stipulation of foreign law contained
a modification acknowledging a United States statute.
In this case the court carefully examined a clause stipulating the ap-
plication of English law and decided against following it, encouraged
to do so by the fact the clause limiting the time for the bringing of
actions specifically conformed the limited time to the requirements of
46 U.S.C.A. 183b.7" The contract of passage for transportation from
New York to Bermuda and return was made in New York. The con-
tract further provided: "all questions arising on this ticket shall be
decided according to English law with reference to which this con-
tract is made." 7 9 The defendant pleaded failure to bring the action
timely, and the immediate issue was the validity of the contractual limi-
tation under the applicable law. But the specific acknowledgment of
a United States statute was central in shifting the balance of contractual
incidents in favor of federal maritime law:
Indeed, the very motion [for summary judgment] before us, involving
a substantive determination of the merits of the plaintiff's claim, calls
76. Supra note 73, at 218; cf. also Haag v: Barnes, 9 N.Y. 2d 554, 175 N.E. 2d 441
(1961).
77. 136 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
78. (Quoted by the court at p. 204): "It shall be unlawful for the ... owner of any
sea-going vessel ... transporting passengers ... to provide by rule, contract, regulation,
or otherwise a shoter period for giving notice of, or filing claims for loss of life or
bodily injury, than six months, and for the institution of suits on such claims, than one
year, such period for institution of suits to be computed from the day when the death
or injury occurred."
79. Supra note 77 at 205.
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for the application of principles developed under rule 56, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. These principles called into
play by defendant's motion for summary judgment, constitute a de-
veloping body of federal law. How then may English law be applied
in determining this motion for summary judgment?
. . . There are additional reasons for our conclusion that federal
law should govern the interpretation of this contract. The inter-
pretation of the limitation clause relied upon by defendant involves
important considerations of internal public policy. 0 . . . The parties'
reliance on a statutory provision of American law, 46 U.S.C.A. 183b,
indicates that construction of the limitation clause be determined
by the decisions of federal courts construing that statute.
. . . Finally, the most salutary resolution of the conflicts problem
is to ascertain the forum having the closest connection with the matters
raised by this litigation. . . . The 'center of gravity' of the contract
is within the jurisdiction of the United States.8 '
Surely the motive behind the reference to United States law in the
time-bar clause in MulvihiI8 2 was the respectable one of averting a col-
lision between the stipulated English law and the widely recognized
national policy the statute embodied. These cases however suggest
neither the good motives, the intent, the language, nor the best wishes
of contracting parties will avail them to have a specified law rule their
contract, when the court is convinced that a different, or perhaps only
more convenient, law is relevant.
THE AVOIDANCE OF STIPULATED LAW
Judicial systems dislike inconvenience in locating the law to be
applied, and therefore, availability of the law stipulated is a persistent
problem contracting parties must face when wanting to specify a law
for their contract. Several cases illustrate the ways in which United
States courts avoid the uncertainties which may follow from the
shadow of a foreign law cast across a litigation. They may decline
80. Scheibel v. Agwilines, Inc., 156 F. 2d 636 (2d Cir. 1946); Witte, et al. v. Neder-
landsch Amerikaansche Stoomvaart Maatschappiaj, 96 F. Supp. 485 (D. NJ. 1951).
81. Supra note 77, at 206. Two very similar time-bar provision cases in which how-
ever the courts struck the balance of contractual connections in favor of the stipulated
Italian law are Caruso v. Italian Lines, S.p.A., 184 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), and
Pisacane v. Italia S.p.A. di Navigazione, 219 F. Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). In each case
the court said no stipulation of foreign law was conclusive for choice of law purposes.
82. Supra note 77.
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jurisdiction, find the foreign law not proved, or find the view to a
particular law not clearly expressed.
The equitable aspect of federal court jurisdiction is the turning point
of United States Merchants' Shippers' Insurance Co. v. A/S Den
Norske Afrika og Australia Linie.8 3 Here a bill of lading under which
goods were shipped on a foreign vessel, by a foreign shipper from
Germany to China, and lost out of Colombo, specified all questions
arising under the bill of lading should be governed by Norwegian law.
The America.n insuror, as subrogee, brought an action of negligence
against the shipowner. However, the district court denied jurisdiction
on the ground that the balance of convenience greatly favored a Nor-
wegian trial.
The libellant claims that because he is a citizen he has a right to sue
defendant in a United States court, despite the fact that he is a subrogee.
The Second Circuit affimed the District Court on the ground that the
jurisdiction of Federal District Courts to try the cases of alien parties
depended upon whether or not its exercise was essential to justice.
The subrogee failed to justify an exception to the general doctrine
that his rights can rise no higher than those of his principal.
In like manner the real nature of the contesting parties controlled
the result in Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen 0. A/S.14
This was a libel by the Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. in admiralty for
the loss of chemical concentrates shipped from Callao, Peru, to Antwerp,
Belgium. The contract was made in Peru by the shipper, a New York
corporation, and defendant Norwegian corporation, with the contract
stating: "Any dispute regarding the interpretation of the rules of this
Bill of Lading is to be decided in Norway according to Norwegian
law which is in every respect governing." 8 5 The shipper began the
quasi in rem suit by attaching credits and effects in the hands of Kerr
Steamship Company glleged to belong to respondent. However, it was
found that in the type of sales contract the plaintiff shipper had with the
Belgian vendee that the plaintiff was in the position of an assignee of
the buyer.
Thus the court ruled:
Since the controversy, arising out of a contract made abroad and gov-
erned by foreign law, is really between aliens and concerns an event
that occurred outside the United States and since none of the wit-
83. 65 F. 2d 392 (2d Cir. 1933).
84. 94 F. Supp. 60 (SD.N.Y. 1950).
85. Id. at 61.
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nesses to the explosion are in the United States or expect to be in the
United States, I feel that justice requires that this court decline juris-
diction.""
Among the cases demanding of contracting parties a clear manifesta-
tion of a view taken to a particular law is Dorff v. Taya,87 a suit
for recovery of prepaid freight where the carrier sank at sea. Although
the bill of lading specified the contract of shipment was to be governed
by Spanish law, the court ruled the narrow procedural defense of
the Spanish statute of limitations had not been clearly contemplated
by the generally phrased stipulation of law to displace the procedural
law of the forum.""
In Hurwitz v. Hurwitz,"9 the Appellate Division held a recitation of
the laws of "Moses and Israel" were to govern an antenuptial agree-
ment made in New York by New York residents, and relied on by
litigants to affect their rights to New York realty, was not a manifest
view to foreign law, because Israel was not at the time a sovereign
state.
The doctrine precluding foreign law from controlling performance
in New York of a New York contract unless the intent was manifest
that it should control was applied in Goodman v. Deutsch-Atlantische
Telegraphen Gesellscbaft" to a case of holders of bonds and coupons
of defendant German telephone company suing for defendant's failure
to pay in United States dollars as specified in the deed of trust under
which the bonds were marketed. The trust agreement stated it was
to be covered by German law, and the plea was of intervening German
law prohibiting payments in dollars.9 ' Although the court said: "If
morals enter into the discussion of the conflict of laws in matters purely
monetary, then what we deem right for the preservation of our financial
structure cannot be wrong when employed by others," 9 it held for
the plaintiff on a ruling that the contract said German law covered the
obligations of the defendant but was silent as to the obligations and
rights of the New York trustee. 3
86. Ibid.
87. 185 N.Y.S. 174 (Ist Dept. 1920).
88. See Overseas Trading Co., SA v. U.S., supra note 20, which upholds a generally
phrased party autonomy clause.
89. 216 App. Div. 362, 215 N.Y.S. 184 (1926).
90. 166 Misc. 509, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 80 (Ist Dept. 1938).
91. Similar legislation figured in the Basel Life Insurance Company case, supra note 40.
92. Supra note 90 at 81.
93. Likewise in Hudsom v. Continental Bus System, Inc., 317 S.W. 2d 584 (Tex.
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It is plain, then, mere reference to a particular foreign law is in-
sufficient unless fully set forth and clearly stated to be controlling. In
Jansson v. Swedish American Line9 4 the contract of passage was signed
in Sweden, and the negligence relied upon occurred in G6teborg
as the plaintiff was boarding defendant's ship. The contract made a
reference to a section of the United States Code,9" but otherwise made
no reference to the law of any jurisdiction. The court ruled on the basis
of the center of gravity theory Swedish law must apply to the validity
of the contract's time bar provision, although such was the subject mat-
ter of the American statute referred to, because the contract contained
no explicit provision that it was to be governed by some particular law. 6
So much for the failure of parties to manifest clearly their intent that
some particular foreign law shall govern their contract. No more does
American law supply the failure of parties to bring their foreign law
into the courtroom with them. Where litigants fail to plead or prove
foreign law the courts sometimes dismiss the contentions the foreign
law is alleged to embody,97 and sometimes apply the law of the forum."
A quaint example of the latter is Todd Shipyards Corp. v. The City of
Athens.99 With an account for above $400,000 for repairs in default of
payment, Todd Corp. libelled the ship City of Athens, and the ship was
sold. Various individuals and classes of persons then sought to assert
maritime liens in the ship herself. For example, one was the tort
claim of Markos Mamoujelos, objecting to the adequacy of $4,000
allowed him by the Commissioner to the District Court for findings
of fact. The Commissioner reported, °10 the ship's articles specified
Greek merchant marine law was to govern the liability of the owner
in certain circumstances. Fortunately for the Commissioner, no foreign
law was pleaded or proved, and he recommended the application of
American admiralty law. The court so ruled.
1958), plaintiff sued in tort for an injury occurring in Mexico or in the alternative for
breach of a bus tour contract made in Texas, and the court applied Texas law despite
the location of the injury because the parties had taken no view expressed or implied
to the law of Mexico.
94. 185 F. 2d 212 (ist Cir. 1950).
95. 46 U.S.C.A. 183b, the time-bar provision statute important to the decision in
Mulvihill v. Furness, Withy & Co, Ltd., supra, note 77.
96. Supra, note 78, p. 219, quoting Liverpool and Great Western Steam Navigation
Co. v. Phoenix Insurance Co, 129 U.S. 397, 458 (1889).
97. Philp v. Macri, 261 F. 2d 945 (9th Cir. 1958).
98. Blumenthal Import Corporation v. Thos. & Jno. Brocklebank, Ltd, 48 F. 2d
727 (3d Cir. 1945).
99. 83 F. Supp. 67 (D. Md. 1949).
100. Id. at 83.
19661
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The discussion of these cases has outlined the present state of party
autonomy in the United States in contracts involving foreign nations'
laws.
CONCLUSION
Close to the surface of all these cases is some judicial suspicion that
contracting parties specifying a foreign nation's law to govern their
contract are seeking to subvert the substance of justice courts feel it
their duty to nurture. Recurrent in the language of the decisions are
appeals to abstract public policies and conscientious reminders, where
party autonomy is acknowledged, that not very different motives and
interests would require different results.
The courts are inconsistent in their concepts of what party autonomy
is or of what it demands.' 0' Very few of these cases' ° demonstrate a
real grasp of what appears to be the essence of the party autonomy
problem: whether or not contracting parties may specify the law that
is to validate the rights and duties their contract frames.
The answer to this in the United States at the present time, where
a foreign contract contemplates United States law or where a domestic
contract contemplates foreign law, appears to be no.
Persons active in international commerce deserve the security of
having this aspect of their uncertainties clarified. The time is due for
courts to state, and contracting parties to understand, in looking toward
the law of a foreign country in their contracts, if they are rather raising
false hopes that settling possible legal strife.
101. Burton, The Uniform Commercial Code and Conflict of Laws, 9 AM. JOUR.
Comp. LAw 458, 462-463 (1960).
102. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Line, Ltd., supra note 54, is notable in this
respect.
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